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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) because this is an appeal from a final decision of the District
Court. This appeal has been transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
A.

Questions Presented and Standards of Review

1.

Did the District Court err in entering its Order dismissing Deer Crest

Associates I, L.C. ss ("Deer Crest") Complaint and entering judgment in favor of Silver
Creek Developmeat Group, L.L.C. ("Silver Creek55)?
2.

Has the appellant preserved and/or asserted any legally recognized ground

for challenging the binding decision of the arbitrator?
B.

Standards of Review

New issues on appeal: Claims not raised in the district court may not be raised for
the first time on appeal. Duke v. Graham, 2007 UT 31, f 26, 158 P.3d 540 (Utah 2007).
A party must give the district court an opportunity to address the purported error or is
precluded from raising the issue on appeal. Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, If 15, 127 P.3d
1256 (Utah 2007).
District Court's Findings: A trial court's factual findings will not be disturbed
unless they are shown by marshaling of all evidence in the record supporting the trial
court's findings to be clearly erroneous. U.R.C.P. 52(a); Bluffdale Mt. Homes, LCv.
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Bluffdale City, 2007 UT 57, \ 46, 582 Utah Adv. Rep. 41. The application of law to facts
found at trial is a mixed question of fact and law. Wayment v. Howard, 2007 UT 56, ^ 9,
144 P.3d 1147 (Utah 2007). This Court defers to the district court's application of law to
the facts, granting broad deference when the issue is extremely fact dependent. Id. "In
addition, when appealing a highly fact dependent issue, the appellant has a duty to
marshal the evidence." Id. The law applied is reviewed for correctness. Jones v.
Barlow, 2007 UT 20, f 11, 154 P.3d 808 (Utah 2007).
District Court's Conclusions of Law: Legal conclusions should be "reviewed for
legal correctness." Morse v. Packer, 973 P.2d 422, 424 (Utah 1999); State v. Deli, 861
P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993) ("We accord the trial court's conclusions of law no deference
but instead review them for correctness."); Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax
Commission, 858 P.2d 1381, 1384 (Utah 1993) ("[W]e afford no deference because they
are conclusions of law and are therefore reviewed for correctness.").
C.

Issue Preservation

Silver Creek asserts that Deer Crest has not properly preserved various issues for
appellate review. This Court's rules require an appellant to demonstrate that issues raised
on appeal were properly raised and preserved in the district court.

U.R.A.P 24(a)(5)(A),

(B). Deer Crest has failed to comply with this Rule. Further, because Deer Crest raises
new issues for the first time on appeal, Silver Creek had no opportunity to address such
issues below.

2

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
U.C.A. § 78B-11-101 etseq is of central importance to this appeal.
STATEMENT OF CASE
A.

Nature of the Case and Proceedings Below

This is an action commenced by Deer Crest for Silver Creek's alleged breach of a
contract for the construction of a portion of a condominium project in Wasatch County,
Utah. Deer Crest filed this action in December 2007 against Silver Creek in District
Court. Silver Creek filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that Deer Crest had not
made a demand for arbitration within thirty days after its claim had arisen, as provided
for under the parties' Agreement and therefore Deer Crest's claim was barred. Record on
Appeal ("R") at 39-45. In the alternative, Silver Creek sought an order from the Court
compelling arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause in § 19.1 of the construction
contract. Id. The District Court granted Silver Creek's motion to compel arbitration and
stayed the matter pursuant to statutory requirements. R. 76-78. The District Court ruled
that Deer Crest waived its right to a judicial determination when it entered into an explicit
agreement to resolve all disputes by binding arbitration.
Deer Crest then filed a claim with the American Arbitration Association. In
response thereto Silver Creek filed a Motion to Dismiss and argued that Deer Crest had
not made a timely demand for arbitration under the provisions of the construction
agreement and thus, the American Arbitration Association lacked jurisdiction to consider

3

Deer Crest's claim. The arbitrator agreed and issued a written decision in which it ruled
that "Deer Crest waived its right to arbitration under the Contract Documents by failing
to file its demand within the time set forth in the Contract Documents. Therefore, [the
court ruled] AAA lacks further jurisdiction to resolve this matter under the Contract
Documents." R. at 81. Consequently, Deer Crest's claim was dismissed from
Arbitration. Id.
B.

Disposition in the District Court

After the Arbitrator dismissed Deer Crest's claim as untimely, Deer Crest moved
the District Court to lift the stay to allow it to litigate its claims in district court. R. 7880. Silver Creek opposed the motion on the grounds that Deer Crest's claims against
Silver Creek had been dismissed in arbitration pursuant to a binding arbitration
agreement, and Deer Crest was precluded from asserting its claims in the courts. R. at
92-] 11. Following briefing and oral argument, the District Court denied Deer Crest's
Motion to Lift Stay and dismissed Deer Crest's Complaint with prejudice, awarding
Silver Creek its attorney fees. R. at 194-198.
C.

Statement of Facts

In July of 2005 the parties to this matter entered into an Agreement which contains
a mandatory arbitration clause, stating the following:
All claims, disputes and other matters in question between the parties to
this Agreement, arising out of or relating to this Agreement or the breach
thereof shall be decided by arbitration in accordance with Construction
Industry Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association unless

4

the parties mutually agree otherwise. Notice of the demand for arbitration
shall be filed in writing with the other party to the Agreement and with the
American Arbitration Association. The demand shall be made within (30)
days after the claim, dispute or other matter in question has arisen. . .The
award rendered by the arbitrators shall be final, and judgment may be
entered upon it in accordance with applicable law in any court having
jurisdiction thereof.
R. at 23-27; Agreement § 19.1 (emphasis added), addendum Exhibit A.
On February 5, 2007 Deer Crest terminated its Agreement with Silver Creek
because of Silver Creek's alleged failure to timely complete the work pursuant to the
terms of the Agreement. R. at 86.
In December 2007, approximately ten (10) months after the claim arose, Deer
Crest originally filed its claims against Silver Creek in the District Court for the Fourth
District of Utah, Heber Department. R. at 3-6. In response, Silver Creek filed a Motion
to Dismiss asking the Court to dismiss the action as untimely pursuant to the contractual
limitation period agreed to by the parties. R. at 40. In the alternative, Silver Creek
requested the court to dismiss the judicial action and order the parties to arbitration. Id.
On February 5, 2008 the District Court issued its Ruling and Order denying Silver
Creek's Motion to Dismiss in part, but granting the alternative request for arbitration. R.
at 76-78. The Court ordered the parties to arbitrate the dispute and stayed the judicial
proceedings "pending completion of the arbitration." Id.\ Ruling and Order, addendum
Exhibit B. In refusing to grant Silver Creek's motion to dismiss, the Court referenced
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and adopted Deer Crest's position that "the timeliness of a demand for arbitration is for
the arbitrator to decide." Id; Ruling and Order p. 2.
On March 13, 2008, more than thirteen (13) months after the claim arose, Deer
Crest commenced arbitration proceedings by filing a Notice of Intent to Arbitrate with
the American Arbitration Association ("AAA"). Thereafter, Silver Creek filed a Motion
to Dismiss, again raising the argument that Deer Crest's claims were not asserted within
the contractual limitation period for the filing of claims. R at 81-87.
On August 5, 2008, the arbitrator issued a written Ruling on Respondent's Motion
to Dismiss. ("Arbitrator's Ruling", addendum Exhibit C; R at 81-87). The arbitrator
carefully analyzed the contract between the parties, including § 19.1 in particular, and
concluded that the parties agreed to require that any claim be filed within thirty (30) days
after the claim, dispute or other matter in question arises. Arbitrator's Ruling, p. 3; R at
81-87.
The arbitrator then considered the question of when the claim arose and
concluded, as a matter of law, that the claims could not have arisen any later than
February 5, 2007, "the date Deer Crest terminated its contract with Silver Creek because
of breach." R. 81-87. Therefore, the arbitrator concluded that Deer Crest's claim was
untimely and granted Silver Creek's Motion to Dismiss. Id. Significantly, Deer Crest
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has not challenged the arbitrator's determination that its claim was untimely under the
contract.
Deer Crest subsequently filed a Motion to Lift the Stay in the District Court from
which this appeal is taken. R. at 79-80. By its Motion, Deer Crest sought to litigate this
matter in District Court after it was dismissed from arbitration. Silver Creek filed an
opposition to Deer Crest's Motion and asked that the Court dismiss Deer Crest's
Complaint with prejudice. R. at 92- 111. After briefing and oral argument on Deer
Crest's Motion to Lift Stay, the District Court dismissed the case with prejudice and
entered judgment in favor of Silver Creek. R. at 194-198. ("Order", addendum Exhibit
D; R at 194-198). The District Court based its Order on the following findings of fact
and conclusions of law:
Findings of Fact:
1) That the matter was properly referred to arbitration and that the arbitrator issued
a written ruling granting Silver Creek's Motion to Dismiss, finding that Deer Crest
failed to file a demand for arbitration within the thirty day limitation period set
forth in the parties' agreement. Because of Deer Crest's failure to file a timely
claim, the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to hear Deer Crest's claim. R. at 197.
2) On July 1, 2005, the parties entered into an AIA A101-1997 Standard Form of
Agreement Between Owner and Contractor ("Agreement"). Paragraph 19.1 of the
Addenda to that Agreement, which was made an enforceable part of the
Agreement, requires that "[a]ll claims, disputes and other matters in question
between the parties to this Agreement, arising out of or relating to this Agreement
or the breach thereof, shall be decided by arbitration .... The demand [for
arbitration] shall be made within thirty (30) days after the claim, dispute or other
matter in question has arisen." Id. (emphasis added).
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3) The Court, having reviewed the record, found that Deer Crest's demand for
arbitration was filed beyond the thirty day limitation period set forth in paragraph
19.1 of the parties' agreement. Id.
Conclusions of Law:
1) That the Agreement between the parties is enforceable, and that the parties
knowingly and intentionally agreed to submit any claim or dispute arising out of
the Agreement to binding arbitration and agreed to be bound by paragraph 19.1 of
the Agreement and the thirty (30) day limitation on the time for filing an
arbitration demand contained therein. R. at 196.
2) That Deer Crest's execution of the Agreement constituted a knowing and
intentional waiver of any right to a judicial remedy under Article I, §§7 and 11 of
the Utah Constitution.1 See Duke v. Graham, 158 P.3d 540, 546 (Utah 2007). The
Court concluded that strict enforcement of paragraph 19.1 of the Agreement would
not violate Deer Crest's constitutional rights. R. at 196.
3) The Court concludes that Deer Crest having waived any right to a judicial
remedy, and having had its arbitration claim dismissed for failure to timely file the
same, Deer Crest has no right to seek a judicial remedy. R. at 196.

Notably, Deer Crest has not properly challenged the District Court's determination that
Deer Crest knowingly and intentionally waived its right to a judicial remedy when it
executed the Agreement. Although the Court characterized Deer Crest's waiver as a
conclusion of law, it is either a finding of fact or a mixed question of fact and law. As
such, appellant is required to marshal the evidence. Deer Crest has not marshaled the
evidence to challenge this finding. Indeed, the pertinent and unrebutted fact is that Deer
Crest signed the Agreement. See U.R.C.P. 52(a); Bluffdale Mt. Homes, LC v. Bluffdale
City, 2007 UT 57, \ 46, 582 Utah Adv. Rep. 41(A trial court's factual findings will not be
disturbed unless they are shown by marshaling to be clearly erroneous); see also
Wayment v. Howard, 2007 UT 56, % 9, 144 P.3d 1147 (Utah 2007) (Appellate Courts
defer to the district court's application of law to the facts, granting broad deference when
the issue is fact dependent). To the extent Deer Crest has challenged the Trial Court's
findings of fact, such should be disregarded for its failure to marshal.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Deer Crest's Complaint was properly dismissed with prejudice from the District
Court because the Court had no authority or jurisdiction to hear Deer Crest's claim as it
had been dismissed pursuant to a valid arbitration proceeding. Deer Crest has not
challenged the arbitrator's decision on any statutorily recognized grounds. By
intentionally and knowingly entering into a valid and binding agreement to arbitrate,
Deer Crest waived its right to a judicial determination of its claims against Silver Creek.
Finally, Deer Crest's constitutional rights have not been violated because an
arbitration proceeding affords due process and provides a party their "day in court" to the
same extent as judicial proceedings.
ARGUMENT
A.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER DISMISSING DEER CREST'S
COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.
1.

The District Court Properly Dismissed Deer Crest's Complaint With
Prejudice Because the District Court Had No Authority to Hear the Matter
as it Had Been Dismissed by an Arbitrator Acting Within the Scope of and
Pursuant to a Valid Arbitration Proceeding.

It is well established in Utah that "[arbitration is a method of dispute resolution
involving one or more neutral third parties whose decision is binding." Miller v. USAA
Casualty Insurance Company, 44 P.3d 663, 673 (Utah 2002). At arbitration, parties are
afforded the opportunity to present evidence and examine witnesses. After evaluation of
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the evidence, the arbitrator makes an award resolving the issues presented. Of paramount
importance is the fact that "the arbitration award is binding and enforceable in court."
Miller at 673; U.C.A. § 78B-11-123; see also 4 Am. Jur. 2d Alternative Dispute
Resolution § 193 (2008) (an arbitrator's judgment has the same effect as a judgment of a
court of last resort); General Exchange Ins. Corp. v. Harmon, 157 S.W.2d 126 (1941)
(the arbitration judgment, if within the scope of the arbitration agreement, is as binding
on the parties as a judgment of a court of law).
Under Utah law it has long been established that the award of an arbitrator
determines the rights of parties as efficiently as a judgment secured by legal procedure
and is binding on the parties until set aside or its validity is questioned in some proper
manner. Giannopulos v. Pappas, 15 P.2d 353 (Utah 1932). Indeed, "a court has no
authority to review the action of arbitrators to correct errors or to substitute its conclusion
for that of the arbitrators acting honestly and within the scope of their authority." Id. at
356.
In very limited situations, the law provides a mechanism whereby parties who are
dissatisfied with an arbitration decision may seek review. However, judicial review of
arbitration decisions is only on narrowly prescribed statutory grounds and is only
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available in certain circumstances. See also DeVore v. IHCHospitals, Inc., 884 P.2d
1246 (Utah 1994) (judicial review of arbitration awards should not be pervasive in scope
or encourage repetitive adjudications but should be limited to the statutory grounds and
procedures for review). Further, an arbitration award will not be disturbed on account of
irregularities or informalities in the proceeding or because the court does not agree with
the award. Id.
Deer Crest and Silver Creek entered into a negotiated and binding written contract
which provided that all disputes arising thereunder would be submitted to and resolved
by binding arbitration. See Agreement at § 19.1. By entering into a binding arbitration

See U.C.A. § 78B-11-124: (1) Upon motion to the court by a party to an arbitration
proceeding, the court shall vacate an award made in the arbitration proceeding if:
(a) the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means;
(b) there was:
(i) evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral arbitrator;
(ii) corruption by an arbitrator; or
(iii) misconduct by an arbitrator prejudicing the rights of a party to the arbitration
proceeding;
(c) an arbitrator refused to postpone the hearing upon showing of sufficient cause for
postponement, refused to consider evidence material to the controversy, or otherwise
conducted the hearing contrary to Section 78B-11-116, so as to substantially prejudice
the rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding;
(d) an arbitrator exceeded the arbitrator's authority;
(e) there was no agreement to arbitrate, unless the person participated in the arbitration
proceeding without raising an objection under Subsection 78B-11-116(3) not later than
the beginning of the arbitration hearing; or
(f) the arbitration was conducted without proper notice of the initiation of an
arbitration as required in Section 78B-11-110 so as to substantially prejudice the rights of
a party to the arbitration proceeding.
11

agreement, the parties intentionally and knowingly waived their rights to have their
claims resolved judicially. The parties5 agreement to arbitrate is an enforceable and
binding contractual agreement that precludes the parties from asserting claims in court.
See Duke v. Graham, discussed infra. Deer Crest signed the Agreement and agreed to its
terms. See Agreement. In fact, Deer Crest acknowledged the binding nature of the
Agreement by submitting its claims to arbitration. R. at 81-87. Deer Crest's claims were
subsequently adjudicated in arbitration and dismissed as having been untimely filed. Id.
Because the parties contractually agreed to mandatory binding arbitration and because
Deer Crests' claims have been dismissed with finality from an arbitration proceeding, no
judicial appeal lies.
Deer Crest cannot simply choose to set aside the arbitration decision because it
disagrees with the outcome. Nor can the court second guess or review the arbitrator's
decision, even though it disagrees with the decision. Therefore, the District Court's
Order should be affirmed and Deer Crest's Appeal must be denied pursuant to the above
authorities which hold that a decision reached in a valid arbitration proceeding is binding

3

Deer Crest now seeks to ignore the parties' contractual agreed-upon procedure
for the adjudication of all disputes. Deer Crest argues that although it had knowingly and
intentionally waived its right to a judicial determination of its claims, it should
nonetheless have the opportunity to litigate its claims in district court after a decision
dismissing this matter was rendered in a valid and binding arbitration proceeding. See
Brief generally.
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on the parties to the same extent as a judgment rendered in a court of law. See Miller at
673.4
2.

The District Court Properly Concluded That The Parties Waived Their
Rights to a Judicial Determination of All Claims.

Parties express their clear intention to waive their rights to a judicial determination
of claims when they contract for and select mandatory binding arbitration as the sole
forum for adjudication. Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court has recently affirmed this
principle and held that "an agreement... to submit to arbitration any existing or
subsequent controversy arising between the parties to an agreement is valid, enforceable,
and irrevocable except upon a ground that exists at law or in equity for the revocation of
a contract." Duke v. Graham, 158 P.3d 540, 542 (Utah 2007). The Duke Court further
held that parties waive "their right to a judicial proceeding through an express agreement
to arbitrate" Id. at 546; See also Pacific Development, DC. v. Orton, 23 P.3d 1035, 10391040 (Utah 2001) (where the Utah Supreme Court held that a written arbitration

4

Arbitration is not a mediation proceeding whereby parties voluntarily come
together to reach settlement; rather, it is a "method of dispute resolution . . . whose
decision is binding." Miller at 673. As outlined above, the law in fact provides a means
whereby dissatisfied parties are able to challenge and appeal an arbitrator's decision in
court; however, Deer Crest's motion to lift the stay and re-commence litigation in district
court is not an authorized means recognized under Utah law. See U.C.A. § 78B-11-124
(outlining the narrow and limited grounds upon which a party may ask the court to vacate
an arbitration decision). A party is not free to simply ask that the court start over again
and re-litigate the matter just because the party disagrees with the arbitration decision.
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agreement constitutes a waiver of parties' rights to formal litigation and that when a party
has waived its rights to a judicial determination, the court is barred from revisiting the
arbitrator's decision).5
Here, the District Court concluded that:
. . . the Agreement between the parties is enforceable, and . . . the parties
knowingly and intentionally agreed to submit any claim or dispute arising
out of the Agreement to binding arbitration and agreed to be bound by
paragraph 19.1 of the Agreement and the thirty (30) day limitation on the
time for filing an arbitration demand contained therein.
R. at 196.
The District Court then analyzed the above Utah authorities and concluded that
pursuant to the Agreement's arbitration provision
. . . Deer Crest's execution of the Agreement constitutes a knowing and
intentional waiver of any right to a judicial remedy under Article I, §§7 and
11 of the Utah Constitution. See Duke v. Graham, 158 P.3d 540, 546 (Utah
2007).
R. at 196.
The District Court's conclusion is supported by Utah law and should be affirmed.
Although Deer Crest does its best to distinguish the holdings of the foregoing authorities,

Deer Crest's attempt to distinguish Kenny is unpersuasive under the facts of this appeal.
Kenny simply stands for the principle that where a party is contractually bound to follow
certain procedures and timelines in order to invoke specified contractual rights, and the
party fails to do so, the party waives his or her rights. Kenny at 998. Moreover, the trial
court in Kenny did not provide a second recourse to a party when that party's claims had
been dismissed in an arbitration proceeding. Id.
14

it fails to do so. As conceded by Deer Crest, "where a party is contractually bound to
follow certain procedures and timelines in order to invoke a specific contractual right and
fails to do so, the party waives that right." See Brief at 13; see also Kenny v. Rich, 186
P.3d 989 (Utah App. 2008); Brinton v. IHCHosps., Inc., 973 P.2d 956, 966 (Utah 1998).
Here, Deer Crest knowingly entered into the Agreement to arbitrate its claims
against Silver Creek. R. at 196-197; see also Agreement. Because the Agreement was an
"express agreement to arbitrate", Deer Crest "waived its right to a judicial proceeding . .
." Duke at 542. This case encompasses the precise situation as envisioned by Duke, i.e.,
because the Agreement is clear and unambiguous as to the parties' intent to arbitrate their
claims, the parties waived their rights to a judicial determination of any claims arising
under the Agreement.
Deer Crest was bound by its agreement to arbitrate. Deer Crest failed to submit its
claim to arbitration in a timely manner and therefore the arbitrator correctly dismissed the
same. The District Court then correctly determined that because Deer Crest had waived
its right to a judicial adjudication of its claims against Silver Creek, it had no jurisdiction
or authority to review or ignore the arbitrator's order. Therefore, judicial dismissal of
Deer Crest's Complaint was mandated. R. at 194-198.
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3.

The District Court's Dismissal of Deer Crest's Complaint Did not Violate
Due Process or The Open Court's Provision of the Utah Constitution.

As set forth above, the District Court applied established Utah law and properly
concluded that "strict enforcement of paragraph 19.1 of the Agreement would not violate
Deer Crest's constitutional rights." R. at 196.
Utah law supports the District Court's conclusion that a freely-entered-into
arbitration agreement is a valid waiver of judicial process and does not violate the parties'
rights to due process. Duke v. Graham, 158 P.3d 540, 546 (Utah 2007); Jenkins v.
Percival, 962 P.2d 796, 799 (Utah 1998); Lindon City v. Eng'rs Constr. Co., 636 P.2d
1070, (Utah 1981) (where the Utah Supreme Court held that due process of law does not
necessarily mean judicial action; rather, due process is in fact afforded by arbitration).
As in Duke, Deer Crest's argument that it was not afforded due process "fails because
[Utah Courts] have clearly held that arbitration proceedings do not violate [Due Process
or the Utah Open Court's provision] . . . [when] the parties have waived their right to a
judicial proceeding through an express agreement to arbitrate." Duke at 546.
Deer Crest does not contest this principle; rather, Deer Crest simply makes the
unsupported argument that since the full merits of its claims have not been heard in the
District Court, that its constitutional rights have been violated. However, the District
Court concluded that based on Deer Crest's knowing and intentional waiver of its right to
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a judicial determination, the court was divested of authority to hear the matter.6 R. at
196. Thus, pursuant to Duke, the trial court's dismissal of Deer Crest's claims do not
violate Deer Crest's constitutional rights under the Due Process Clause or the Open
Courts Provision of the Utah Constitution. Duke at 546.
Moreover, Deer Crest's argument that it was denied due process because the full
merits of its claims were not heard is undermined by long-established Utah law. The
appellate courts of Utah have consistently held that a dismissal with prejudice based on
procedural deficiencies does not violate due process or parties' constitutional rights.
Colosimo v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Salt Lake City, 104 P.3d 646 (Utah App. 2004).7
Therefore, because Deer Crest waived its right to a judicial adjudication of its
claims against Silver Creek and because its claims were properly dismissed from
arbitration, the trial court did not violate Deer Crest's constitutional rights in dismissing
its Complaint with prejudice.

As set forth in Section I, above, Courts have authority to review arbitration awards only
on narrowly proscribed statutory grounds. Deer Crest has not challenged the arbitrator's
ruling on any of these narrow grounds.
7
See also Gordon v. Maughan, 204 P.3d 189 (Utah App. 2009) (where Utah Court of
Appeals held that the dismissal of an appeal from justice court when defendant failed to
follow appropriate procedures did not violate the defendant's constitutional rights);
Rohan v. Boseman, 46 P.3d 753 (Utah App. 2002) (where Utah Court of Appeals
affirmed dismissal with prejudice on procedural grounds when plaintiff failed to
prosecute its case).
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4.

The Arbitrator's Decision to Apply the Thirty Day Time Limit to Seek
Arbitration Is Binding and Enforceable.

Contrary to Deer Crest's argument, the Trial Court did not apply a thirty day
statute of limitations to Deer Crest's claims against Silver Creek; rather, the Court
dismissed the case based on the parties' Agreement and upon a final decision entered by
the Arbitrator. R. at 196. However, even if the thirty day limitation set forth in section
19.1 of the Agreement is construed as a statute of limitations, such is not unreasonable.
Utah courts have endorsed the widely applied principle that parties may agree on a
shorter limitation of time for commencing an action for breach than is provided by the
statute of limitations. This principle has been confirmed and established as far back as
1919 in Clark v. Lund, 184 p. 821 (Utah 1919) (parties to a contract may agree on a
shorter limitation of time for commencing an action for breach than is provided by the
statute of limitations, provided the period agreed on is not unreasonable) and affirmed by
the Supreme Court in Hoeppner v. Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Company, 595 P.2d 863
(Utah 1979) (where Supreme Court held that Contractual limitations of time in which to
bring actions on contract, if reasonable, are valid, binding and enforceable).8

Other jurisdictions generally are in agreement with Utah law. Under Massachusetts
law, contracting parties may agree upon a shorter limitation period as long as it is
reasonable. Bull HNInformation Systems, Inc. v. Hutson, 118 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D. Mass.
1999, rev'd on other grounds 229 F.3d 321 (1st Cir. 2000) (applying Massachusetts law).
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Thus, the arbitrator made a well reasoned and well supported decision to enforce
the thirty day contractual limitation period. But that is not the issue on this appeal
because the parties agreed to be bound by the arbitrator's decision, without a right of
appeal. Consequently, the decision of the arbitrator, right or wrong, if made in good faith
and without any violation of U.C.A. § 78B-11-124, is not subject to judicial review. As
noted above, in this case appellant has not raised below nor asserted in this appeal any
ground to vacate the award under §7 8B-11-124.
Therefore, because Deer Crest expressly consented and agreed to bring any claim
against Silver Creek within thirty days after it had arisen, because the law allows parties
to contract for shorter time limitations than the applicable statute of limitation, and
because the arbitrator's decision is not subject to review or appeal, Deer Crest's claims
are barred as a matter of law.

Under New York law, parties to a contract may agree to limit the period of time
within which an action must be commenced to a shorter period than that provided by the
applicable statute of limitations. Maxcess, Inc. v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 433 F.3d
1337 (11th Cir. 2005) (applying New York law).
Under New York law, parties to a contract may designate a reasonable period of
limitations within which a claim arising out of the contract is to be commenced, even if
that period is shorter than the statutory period. North American Foreign Trading Corp. v.
Mitsui Sumitomo Ins. USA, Inc., 413 F. Supp. 2d 295 (S.D. N.Y. 2006) (applying NY
law).
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B.

DEER CREST CANNOT RAISE THE ISSUE OF AMBIGUITY OF
AGREEMENT IN ITS APPEAL BECAUSE IT WAS NOT RAISED
BELOW.
Although Deer Crest briefly attempts to argue that the District Court erred by not

finding the Agreement to be ambiguous as to the consequences of failing to abide with
section 19.1 of the Agreement, Deer Crest has not properly preserved this issue for appeal
and cannot be heard to argue it now. See Brief at p. 15-16. Deer Crest did not argue
below that the Agreement was ambiguous and did not preserve this issue below or in its
Docketing Statement. R. at 143-150; 194-198. It is well established that courts will not
consider matters raised for the first time on appeal. Wade v. Stangl, 869 P.2d 9, 11 (Utah
App. 1994); see also Brookside Mobile Home Park, LTD. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, f 14,
48 P.3d 968, 972; see also State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah App. 1993) (stating
that for an issue to be properly preserved for appellate review, it must be raised to a level
of consciousness such that the trial judge can consider it).
Here, as demonstrated from the trial court's Order and record below, Deer Crest
did not argue that the Agreement was ambiguous in the District Court proceedings.
Therefore, Deer Crest's argument that the Agreement is ambiguous with respect to the
parties' intentions of the consequences of failing to abide with section 19.1 of the
Agreement must be disregarded.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing points and authorities, Silver Creek respectfully requests
that this Court deny Deer Crest's Appeal and Affirm the District Court's Order herein.

as,•6

DATED this C*-May of June, 2009.
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ

Evan AV&chmutz
Andy V. Wright
Attorneys for Silver Creek
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
The undersigned hereby certifies that on t h e o ^ ^ a a y of June, 2009 she caused a
true and correct copy of the foregoing to be delivered to the following:
Eric G. Easterly
2524 Fairway Village Drive
P.O. Box 681238
Park City, Utah 84068-1238
Sent Via:

X.

Hand-Delivery
Facsimile
JVlailed (postage prepaid)

22

ADDENDUM

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Exhibit

Title

A

Agreement

B

Ruling and Order

C

Arbitrator's Ruling

D

Order

EXHIBIT A
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Document A10T-1997
Standard Form olAgrewmt
wher$ the basis cfpaytrmtis

B&tw&$n Owner and Contractor

a STIPULATED SUM

July
Five
AGREEMENT m&&& as of the First day of bm» ia &e year of Two Tbousaad aad:
fin wrsfo indicate day, month and y#ar)
BETWEEN theQwaer:
(Name, address and ether

informatbn)

Deer Crest Associates I L i X
853 East Valley Boulevard
STB #200
Sas Gabriel Caiiferaia 91776
Te^cneNtttaban S25-2SG-2S25
FaxNusnfaer: 626-2804839
and &e Contractor;
fNome, address md cth&r lyifofrnativn)
Silver Creek DevetopiDent Group, LLC, liimted Liability Coxopaay
3610 North. University Avenue
STE#275
Provo, Utah 84604
TrieptioceNiuaxbw: 80i 7 374-8500
Fax Number. 801-3744301
The Project is:
(Name and location}
Deer Crest Town Homes
Deer Vally, Utah
The Architect is:
f/fcme, address and otfutr information)
ISA Architects, LLC, Limited Lkb2ity Ccrspany
3115 East UaaLaae
S3E'#30D
Sab Lake City, Utah S4117
TsiephoaeNcxaber: 801-278-8151
Fax Number 801-Z78-8661

ADDITIONS AND DELETIOSS:
The author of this document has
addterf information neededforte
completion. The author may siso
hewe revised thetextof the
original AfA standard form. An
Adtf&or&md Options Report
that notes added Infcmnaiicn as
wa8 m revisions to the standard
formtext& available from the
author and &houfd be reviewed.
A wfcai &*e In tie left margin of
this document indicates where
the author has added necessary
Information and where the author
has added to or delved from me
original AfA-text
This document has important
legal consequences.
Consuftafcon vrtth an attorney
Is encouraged with respecs &
Its comptetidn or rrK^Scaftcn.
AIA Document A201-199?,
Ganers* Conditions of the
Contract ior Censtnjction, is
atkpted In this document by
reference. Do not use with other
genera! conditions unless this
document h modified.
This document has been
approved and eft doised by The
Associated Genera! Contractors
of America.

The Owner and Cco&actor agree as follow.

AIA oocumtftiAW*~ie*7,c«pyri$ftt $ tets, lets, teas, tesr. «esii t«e, iaw, ieea, t*s?> i«7«, ts?7, ma, i m , test and *s$7 by Tte
Americanfctfltote of A*enfcids. AH ftgtkis f*g#rv&dL WAfWlNO* this AJA* Oocwrtwias Is proi«€**$fcy U.S, Copytigh*. U w fittf ifiiwnsuontl 7wat$t»,
Un*trthod**d reprotfycHfth or tftetribu&m ot (hi* AiA4 Qoet«neni m any portfon of fit may tt$vit In **vtrt cfrH tntf srimta*? pen**?**, *n$ w&t be
pr<s*«euttrf to Ik* m*x*mum *x**fti posflfete umfer *h» few, fbfe dosumsftf w*i productfcyAJA softsrar* $ i3;3&25 3ftOSte4&OD* under Ctftfer
MaJC00118S87J wfcteh *xpif«s on 5rt 8^005, en£ Is nottofr*s*te
lk*r Notes:
(a&IUStSS)

Tiie^eb

5 09:44:32 2008

435-940-0468

P. 3

ARTICLE 1 THE CONTRACT DOCUMENTS
The Cqj&act Doctnoents consist of Shis AgreetoenL Conditions of the Contract (General, Supplementary and other
Cond&oaa), Drawings, Specifications, Addenda Issued prior to execution oftWs Agwm£&> other docsuneaiif listed
\sx this Ag*w»»«tf aad Modifications issued after execution of this Agreeiaeat; these fane &e Contract, and are as
fully a part of the Coatract as if attached to thai Agreement or repeatedfesreiruThe Contract represents the entire
mi mteps&d agreemeut between the parties hereto aad supersedes prior negotiations, representations or
*greessents, either written or oral An eaoxueotoa cf the Contract Docotteats, other than Modification** appears to
Articles.
ARTICLE 2TOEWORK OF THIS CONTRACT
The Contractor sha& folly execute &e W o * described m the Ccafcract #ocmtmoisT except to the exfcmt specifically
indicated ia the Contract Xtecuxaen& to be the impossibility of others.
ARTICLE 3 DATE OF CQMMENCEMEMT AND SUBSTANTIAL COMPLETION
§ 11 The dale of comxneE^emeafc of the Work shall be the date of thia Agreement u&Iess a different date is stated
below or provtaioo Is made for due date to be fixed in a notice to proceed issued by the Owner,
(Insert the data of commencement tfit differsfrom the date of this Agreement or, if applicable, state that the date
mil be fixed xn a notice to proceed)
The cotnmencgiagot date *fli be fixed in a notice to proceed
If, prior to the commettt^aamt of the Work, the Owner requires time to file asartgsges, mechanic's Hens and other
security interests* the O d e r ' s tone reqtfemeat shaE be as follows:
XA
§ 2U The Contract Tinoe shall be measured from the date of comsBSBecrcsat.
§ 3,3 The Contractor shall scbieve Subtfaatifil OnapletiQs of the entire Work not later thm 24Q days from the dale
of aammensemeaL or as follows;
{Inserfnumber of calendar daps. Alternatively, a calendar dote m&y be used when coordinated with the date of
commencement Unless stated elsewhere in the Ceramet Document, insert any requirements for earlier Substantial
Completion of certain portions of the Work)

Portion of Work

Substantial GempUficn Date

° f c f l w e 0 c e " M l t o f construct
(Insert provisions, if arty, for liquidated damages relating to failure to complete on time orfor bonus payments for
earty completion of the Wort)
f *ubj«*toi3uitTO^

ARTICLE 4 COKTRACTSUM
§ 4.1 The Gtvser shall pay the Contractor the Contract Sum m current funds for the Contractors performance of the
Contract The Contract Sum shall be
{$ )* subject to addition and deduction as provided m the Contract
Documents,
$1,588,926.45
J£*£
^MjlJA
§ 4,2 The Contract Sum is based upou thefollowingalternates, if a&y, which are described in the CaatrJct
Docussents aad are hereby accepts by the Owner
(State the numbers or other identificaticm of accepted alternates. If decisions on other alternates are to be mode by
the Owner sttbsequent to the execution of this Agreement, attach a schedule of such ether alternates showing the
amount for each and the date when that amount expires)
"Owue^&'&LiUtyiu pujink tirffiao'ispaea wil^do^fDQtro'biiildigig •ontrflot dmomfcfcy$5Q0&iQQ BuiMiag
fcAOofctffrxmt A1W< ~ 1 W . Copyright € 1915. « t S r 1325» 1837. iSSJ, 195*, 19$!, 1803, tW7,1574, 1977,19BCt t « 7 r 1991 *nd t2$7t>vTte
Am*r*cafl Sn*tfoJt» of Attracts, Aftright* r*s*rv»d, WAHtflNO: Thte « A * Dosvmem to ?rm*t;i*& by US. CopyrtgMUw *nrf latamsttonal Treatia*
Un*utb(Wfc*d r*j>rixJuct$<Mi of rfltIffoutfoft 6f tJus AtA* Dormant, $r «ty pstfton of H, may msuft to **v*f« dvB end criminal psattttit, and w[R b«
pros*eu*»d to thft maximum extent powifefct undtar ?h« tsw. Thar tfocument *a* prfHft£»ti by A1A K>fty»ar« *t }33&;ZS an tjaa^2004 undei Or^af
No. tOOOl 18887 J which «xplf<i on 5W2O05, ««t are^torresale.

0/

b ua:<K:jz ^uua

'tds-d^u-u^bb

F. «

§ 43 Uxat paces, if aay, arc as follows
Description

Unite
M

See Addenda **G B u d g e t f o r

IOTJ?

s m line

Pric*{$0JJQ)
iteias

ARTICLES PAYMENTS
§5.1 PROGRESS PAYMENTS
§ 5,1.1 Based upon Applications for Payment $ubrn£?ted to the Owner by the Contractor «ad Certificates for Payment
issued by the Contractor* the Owner shall make progress payments on account of the Contract Sum to the Coniractor
as provided below gad elsewhere in the Contract Documents.
§ 5.12 The period coveted by each Application for Payment ahali be one caieadar tnonth eading on the last day of
the month, or as follows:

§ 1 1 3 Provided that m AppUc&tionforPayment is received by the Owner not later than the Thirtieth day of a
ir&nth* the Owner shall :coate^
Thirtieth day of the following no&fo.
If an Application for Payment is received by the Owner after the application dak fixed above, payjnent shall be
made by the Owner not later Shan Thirty ( 30 ) days after the Owner receives the Application for Payment

Sfot more than 1 payment per each 30 day period shall be submitted by Contractor *
§ 5.1 A Each Application far Payment shall be based on the naosi recent schedule of vaiaes submitted by the
Contractor in accordance with the Contract Documents. The schedule of values shall allocate the entire Contract
Sum ajnoxig the various portions of the Work The schedule of values shall be prepared in such form and supported
by such teu to substantiate its accuracy as the Owner may require. This schedole, unless objected to by the Owner,
shall be used as a basis for reviewing the Contractor's Applications for Payment
15.15 Applications for Payment shall indicate the percentage of completion of each portion of the Work as of the
end of the period^ covered by &e Applicafioa for Paytn&nt.
§ 5,1 JS Subject to other provisions of the Contract Documents, the asjount of each progress payment shall be
computed as follows:
.1 - Take that portion of the Contract Som property allocable to completed W o * as determined by
multiplying the percentage completion of each portion of the Work by the share of the Contract Sum
allocated to that portion of the Work in the schedule ofvatoe^teoQ-rrtoinaflti ft£~-~~4~<^ Pending
final detenmnasion of costio the Owner of changes in the Work, amounts not in dispute shall be
included as provided in Section 7,3,8 of AIA Document A2014997;
,2

Add that portion of the Contact Sam properly allocable to materials and equipment delivered and
suitably stored "a? the see for subsequent brcorponden in che completed construction {or, if approved
in advance by the Owner, suitably stored off the site at a. location agreed upon in wciting),46s&~
rBtaiifflgbof
( ...)v

.3

Subtract &e aggregate of previous payments made by the Owner, and

A

Subtract amounts.,rfany, for which the Architect has withheld or nullified a Certificate for Payment
as provided in Scciioa 95 of AIA Document A20M997.

§ 5.17 The progress payment amount determined in accordance with Section 5.3.6 shall be further modified under
thefollowingcirxaaastancea'
.1

Add* npon Substantial Completion of the Work, a sum sufficient to increisc the total payments to the
M l amount of the Contract Sam, less such amonnts^as the Owner shall determine for incomplete
Work* retaisage applicable to m& work and unsettled claims* and

jUADocumsnt Altf"~1997.C6pyrty* 6191$,18JS, 1825, 1107.19S1.195a, 1«M, 5963,19$M*74.1977, ?980, t9$7.1991 *fld JSS? by The
Amartean \nmm«l Arafcft&ct*. Aflrigfcfexm*nm&. WARUHNGi Thi* AUr Decern****fcproUrcted by i)J$> Copyrtgfct Law and fMKAttiftnaJ Trvattta.
Uftfcu thorftttfi r*p*<Ktvc$i<?ftor tlfitifauUcmvf ihK AUT OocoiTumt, & any parties offt,m*y rwatxOL In atvsr* cftli «wl $r>mi«a? jj*mau*s, §r\d wtftfc*
prt**cut0d to &e maximum *xt*ni poa*lbte vm<*#? the law. Thfe teum^tv^-pfodatsesfy AiA tolt^tft at !33S:2S on Q5£#20Q4 urc&r Order
NatOO0tta967J wtteti e*p*res en S/jattBC^ aftd t* no*ftsr**ate
VwHotttK
{226titt«5ag

*
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(Section 9.8JjtfAM. Document A2Q1499? requires release of applicable retaina%e upon Substantial
Completion of Work with cmsentqf surety, if any*)
2

Add, if final complsti&a of the Wotfc is therea&er notarially de&yed through so fault of the
Contractor, any additional amounts payable in acasrdance *ntk Section 5.10.3 of A1A Document
A30U997.

§ 118 Reduction or limitation of retainage, if any, stall be as follows:
(if it is inwidzd, prior to Su&sttmiial Completion oftke entire Work to reduce or limit the retatmge resulting from
the percentages inserted in Sections 5,L&1 and$J,62 above, mid this is not explained elsewhere in Hie Contract
Documtnts, insert here provisionsforsuch reduction or Urmtazian-)

§ 119 Except with the Owner's prior approval, the Contractor stall not mafce advance payments to suppliers tot
materials or equipment which have no* bees delivered $sA stored at the site,
$55 A M . PAYMENT
§ 5.2,1 Final payment, constituting the entire unpaid balance of the Contract Sum, shall be made by the Owner to the
Contractor when*
,1

the Contactor has fu&y performed hi Contract exceptfor the Contractor's responsibility to correct
Wade asprovided ia Section 1222 of AlADoeamest A2Q1~I997V and to satisfy other requirements*
if any, which extend beyond final payment; and

2

a fraal Certificate for Payment has been "issued by the Contractor and a C of O has bees issued by
'. Wasatch Coimtyand the Wauuch County Fire District
- 3 C o m p l e t i o n o f Owner T > i m c b l i s t s I f a n y .
§ S.Z2 The Owner's final payment to the Contractor shall be made no iaier than 30 d^ays after the issuance of the
Architect's Snai .Certificate for Payment, or as follows:

ARTICLES TERMINATlOSORSUSPEMaON
16*1 The Contract may betenbi&aiedby the Owner or the Contractor as provided in Article 14 of AIA Document
A20MW71
§12 The Work may be suspended by the Owner as provided in Article 14 of AIA Document A2Q1-1997,
ARTICLE? MiSCaUNEOUS PROVISIONS
§ TA Where reference is made in this Agreement to a provision of A1A Document A2014997 or another Contact
Document, the reference refers to that provision as amended or supplemented by other provisions of the Contract
Docnmcms.
§ 72 Payments due and unpaid leader the Contract shalfbear interest from the date payment is doe at the rate stated
bdo **, or in the absence thereof, at the legal rate prevailing from time to time at the place where the Project is
located.
(Insert rate of interest agreed upon, if my.)
(

) per annum

2% p e r month

(Usury laws and requirements under the Federal Truth tn Lending Act, similar state and beat consumer credit lam
and other regulations&t the Owner's and Contractor's principal places ofbusinessr the location of the Project and
elsewhere may affect the validity of this provision. Legal advice should he obtained with respect to deletions or
modifications, and also regarding requirements sucft as written disclosures ar waivers.)
§ 7,3 The Owner's representative is:
AJfcOacumantMot™ ~iaa?.C*j>yrigM 6 *St5» m% 1*3$, tSfc?( i*St f95S, t9S\, W3.19&7,1874, t*?7, t98Q.1B87, m* artf 1997 by Tf*
Amariw institute of Afsh*t*e& Aa rights f$s*?v*<i WAGING: Thh A i r Ooctimefti i$ protected &y U.S, Copyright U w *r>d tntfirn*ttan?f TrtaOas *
UftattfhsrfcSd jeprctffaciJafl fir dtetrfbtfttcft cffcfflsAlA* 0scumftftt,*r*Ay portlO* <Jf it, may re*yfe m sever* cfcrfl »n<i criminal pet^ltJes, an^ win W
pf««cuN« t« ih« muxltmtm **t*eti p&**\%t* w\4*r lb* !**, This document w « prcd«c«d by AtA seft*mr« K tOiSS*^ cn05te4#0D< urui^r Ord*
No.10001tS987_l »midi axpftt* on 5/t8/2QaS, and is nottorIMSI*.

ff

(blame, address and other infarrnatlon)
Scott S. Stedekar
853 Ssst Valley Boaiev&rd
STES20O
San Gabriel; Califcras 91776
TelephoneNamber 32M8S-85S0 6 2 6 / 1 8 0 - 2 8 2 5
§ 7,4 The Coskactar'8 refreseatatfv* b;
(Name* address and ether information)
Geoffrey Qraaum
3610 North University A m u e
STE#2?5
Provo, Utah 84604
Tdephane Number 101*374*8500
F&xNaxoben 801474-8501
MobLte Haia&*r. 801-362-4423
1 7 i S r i t t o the Owner's sor the Contractor's representative shall be changed without tec days writtea notice to the
ctfc&f patfy<
§ 7,6 Other provision:

AR71CIE8 SNUMERATIQH Of CONTRACT DOCUMENTS
§ 8*1 The Contrast Doccanftsts, except to ModiScafciros issued after exec&ticn of this Aj^eemeat, axe enumerated as
follow fi) date of plans* (5J) addeadms
§ t i l Tte Agreejcfindt is this executed 1997 edalkm of the Standard Pons of Agreement BetweeaCwaer aad
Contractor. AIADocuxoeBt A1014397.
18.15 Tte Gexseral C0ad&ofc$ are cbe 1997 edition of the General CoxtdiiSoas of the Cataract for Cccstnxctias, AIA
Dooraaeat A2QW997*
§ 5.1*3 The Sappleaeniary and cither Conditions of the Contract are those contained ia the Project Maauai dated
and are as follows
Document

T8te

P^Q155

JSA AIA
Building 5
§ 8,14 The SpeciScatioss are those contained m &e Project Maaosl dated as in Section S13, sad are as follows:
(Either list ite Specifications here cr refer to an exhibit attached to this Agreement)
Title of Specifications exhibit
§ 8 15 The Dr&w&gs are as fellow, aad are dated
unless a different date i$ ahowa below:
{Either list the Drawings here or rqfer to en exhibit attached to this Agreement.)
Title of Dwv&gs exhibit*
18,16 The Addenda if aay, aie as follows:
iddeuda ki
Timeline
Addenda Er M i s c e l l a n e o u s P r o v i s i o n
A£&*ad& B r General C o n d i t i o n s of t h e C o n t t a c t & I n s u r a n c e Uequircmeats
Addenda Ct Budget
kddeuda D: Suaxauty
MMKO0 IrtKrtwa of ArstuURU, Ml rights nacratf. WANING, Ttat AIA Doeumitt ft preUeiitf by US. CflfytlftM U * smt taiamalioitti Trtttto
ttnwthorizi* rttpmsfoefcors or tfittrteutia* a* lh& AIA' Opcvmam, o; t«y portion $t ft, m«y f*»Lr$t ir **v*m clvfl *** srimtami pwaftfoi. *n$ wii be
ptc8fi<i*it* \tt ih* mixJmu^n txteftt pB«Ibit undtr m« kte, Th^i tixntfttftt w i i ^a5uc^}fey AIA scrfNw* *t t3;35,J5 PA05/2<vaC04 u n t o Oft3«<*
Ha^odW«856^^1 wwch tsgavn «n s*is^?os, and is net ty msatt
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Note; This Addrtbns and D«i*fton$ 8sport is provfd«d for Info nation purposes only and & not incorporatedfoiaor constmata any
pan of tha associated AiA documentTOsAdd&fcss and Oblations Report and & associated documam wars ganaratad
simutataaysfy by AiA software «r !3 35£5 on 05#4/2&Q4*
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§ 3,3 The Contractor shall aciueve Substantial Gomplztxcz of the enttre Work not later thw 2i& ^ J 5 fr°& the date
of comffleacetaenu or as follows;
I n a c c o r d a n c e vlfch EadfadLblt A
PAGE 3

| $.1.1 Based apoa Application for ?*ymeat subletted to the AiohUoofrgaSBgfaythe Contractor asad Certificates
for Ptyacat issued by the ,A^^<^M^o^^c.tor, lbs Owner ahaU make progress payments OB aceoojat of the
Contract Sum to the Contractor as provided belcw aad elsewhere in the Contract Documents
§ 5,1,3 Provided tot aa Agpifcafioa for Payment is received by the Aflritoe^-QasBg got later than tte Thirtieth day
of a moath, the 0 waer shall mato payment to tbe Contractor not later than the Thirtieth day of the following
jtsomh. If an A#pUca&m for Payment is received by tbe AffthifoafcOwQer after the application date fixed above,
payment shall be made by the Qwaer not later than Thirty ( 2£ ) days after the Msfaitaos >Q&tfit receives the
Application for Faysoeiit
§ 5*14 Each Application for Payxseat sbsll be baaed on the roost recent schedule of values subtnitted by tbe
Contractor is accordance with tbe Contract Documents. Tbe schedule of values shaft allocate the entire Contract
Sum amoflg tbe various portions of the "Work The schedule of values shall be prepared is such form and supported
by such data to substaatiate]i$ accuracy a$ the Architect pwpey may reqtdre. This schedule, unless objected to by
the Agehi^HQaaBL shall be tased as a basis for reviewing the Contractor's Applications for Payment
,1

Add, upon Substantial Completion of the WoA, a sum sufficient to increase the total paymeats to the
full amount of the Coi&act Sam* less such asaotxsis as the Agoteteot^hSSSt $ba& detename for
iircoinpfete Work, retainage applicable to sooh work and unsettled claims; md

2

a fioai Certificate for Paymsnt has bees issued by the AruhitiH)t£ogtractor and a C of O has b$e$
issued by Wasatcfr Couatv and the Wasatch Coraty Fire fiistr>c^>
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f.2 Prtof fo c&mmemefji oe worn; Contractor ahafl M
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connadian w*lh ^ s w t k :to$t#Drt#a* tf semeferatfjtifef rf Ms rngponsBAf h
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paagjtoh, O^noe msjf, at fjia s p f e , p«y Ihe s«n4 arnihbs cost thamoi $hs& tje|<l@chmfe6 l^pm the centred turn.
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wdsnes ot to^iy afc J ^ « A :orn^ens3t«^ ^Ur334, The c s f f e t a s $h^i pwlcfe lor,
A, A #jafanUfc& H*fw (30) % s f>oiiC5 ^ 0*ft5r prior lo^ncelisgon $ any policy. Un$aage sw^ as "will endeavor to wili ^ ^ 4%y$
mtum rtotioe" »«3' L btit tailRft ^<B m^8 JBU^ ks^c^ $^ail im^sse W ofclteatifrq or Ji^illty of a«y kin^ upon the ccmpanyt fU
*5**t* »r fep#WarJUtJve&* - fe yn$ec€ptab}£ sh^^KXJ^ t>$ stndten.
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Owner,
42

ConWtttof «W**£>liidbmr^^ dfi^»ndindhc^^h^fn^fe^ ftg (towasid tf of 0ym?$ effete, tgastfc « d ^npfoyiu to&n srtf agamit
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cfefttagt

or dno&*« fc t w p i ^ £ r . ' ^
te
or ,8^ng^iJ# ds^i trf pessom { i ^ K ^ g She cpo«s> agatt* 3&5 entpfe^s of Owmr or
Cantraaior); any c a a r a ^ | d 4 ^ sny aa of ©miss&n ^pyittw&r rented. <finse^or-iri(S^cly,feContractor's'wo* mdsr this contract,,
A, Ttejwfonrcratf
• 8. The p m e m ^ < k « p ^ - y a r v 6*ftSfsF&t^*fe&. eapfoysss, Of p a ^ s 3 c l % v i ^ 3s pennfcsiav axpr«s«*d &' implied, on &•
ftboyi tHe premise d$&Q*tm.

it

Gwatfof trfhft *«**& #h( fafcraa; state, artf ]6c£ p * tm,,.«9cW s w f ^ <^$,
.ronpersatfan ^ ^ f e ^ ^ s ? ^ aPi^fi^fe to ^ e j^^s^nce offif^si'contfjawJL^> C^w^^wc&or L
every n ator a *#&h my p- t r f l p ^ ^ e ^ ^ W ^ f i t t & i i ^ •Bjfa^ivpm\jlwt
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corr^wsafton' acts 6nd mftm*
p*f «H texas, Ikensas, im$ and jiwt^ts Of
{or ether things used M the patfcimsrsqB of
sny tax (txdydsig ^fop^rt^ tsxe4 fc^ose,
pary &e SBmeJsnd the CD^ mamof jhafiba

6. t Ocwfcwkr agiws w i p « i snema ^ f a s js? pwscaje jhR WoHc £%sr% ^nd ^ c w l y ^ IH to perform any prolan of Ms contact, iha
Ow?^, sftar tfm^ttm <fe^* «^sn noltj&lto ^e hm&ti®, ^rt;'WRtaut (^afc&-te sw sfher mmec^ ?fe msy h^e, make good such
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8.2

to omvfaQ «rt ^s Wbi^, ins Contrartor s ^ lafe r^cja^ary prscauii^s to pmtaet property the imi&&d *&& m oth«r uadss imm damags
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de?3iifi by ConUpctoq ii^iiFtfs'i&i£gwpktand fe W ^nasf %^£ b&;dedae4tf Jrom" (teIContracf price

0;&QCVmn& tniJ-Ss^i^TrSi^ntOe&fe^ScW S^rf^^^tiimS^vai'' 'Crwrftr mSxl<~n£LnOOC
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5.1 Ctatfactor &W* ( « w k Sfe jffc&asaiyfcofer^qMirerf torte&pteikstor his *?ofctafcjtirig,fcutoft limited to the <*fic*irvg - powm generator,
tfacirlca? catfc; temjWv f$$foei such u pm& M ^ tooes, sis&r meter*, &&*t$; ^ffolAng, ?od$te< t>dtf;toe&( tamp*^ da*fce$,
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CortteJtor eisR $ u ^ t ie CH?nef, if requfest^ s ?/jfgsn ne^ ctm m e t ^ i ^
to avoid <fciay to <ht papcttflafl of the prqte as a t
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TZJ houn pftor noUce to me Owarifot (fefiwry c* miierfalj end e<^nnert lu to*
« 8 . t o . f t e t e & ^ - r o h ^ n t t sta»».-end yrt^cfoft of sa^d m^enaa y d
jaqaMfty awd-cott of ^<fer^acl^f .Q^mMi mbt rescpf^^e, nor vektexpp

11,1 On 3 d$y pasfs Cmfrktorfjet Hz own agpens* andfeist, sh«H si all iime kes^ the $cb$kh frne from accumtdaffoir of wasls irtaiaftsf ot
nfcjsish caiiserf or pteptedpy Me made. Upcsii connate^ ^ CoftWtart woKjhe $hrft*a«Ss o*n expa^e.snd cosl ternavs all rubk$\
suiplu&meteriaL tofe Mffof<Srgt 2M sspbrnert g^ay fern the joEsiia. $nd\bs premises; afwt be Jen towmbtorfcr lis e^iwa^ent tffiiew
oih®i^4» ipedftei by feo^r. fr» ^e event ^ dJ^ie as to #* msponaUtty for feiwaJ p nibbfs.^ ton ?hs jc^slie, Ow>«r may mmo^
the nifeh and dtaga We cost t?>emof to Jlhe vaooy^ <W&GS>fi fespo*i5B2ie ^9mfor k» %^ r^ticrt as me b # w , at his sds dhoralm,
$na«l ^etermim toDenkJ«rif such »noc«Spn ehi{befa*Mng o* mCtmmztim.

121 There sh?f< he w ^

^m& TO CONTRACT
»!or(ter i& (his Contract ^es^slreecf ID \mlhg between the p&fcs Hareio

2irtis?*4 *ortf wi $tc^ &#y in ik{ srga. «nd wifi «quhe wftian vsrite^on or
^sdsiocv ton the bwner <or anr change oxd^ Ihdtnsjf I :ur. ConirBsior ihsl?ffjskeany &4 ell chsnoes tn ^ e Wdrk from ^ne Orawngs 2r>d
SpeQfkstJcs\& o^ft\eCWrest Oooimemt w^mil im^is .ina eHs Cm??3Ct wae^ speefficaf^ ordered lo do so in v/mmg by ta 0«m^. The
CeftWBto^i P^" V5ff4co^W««ma^ o?;sy£h-f3ianse IQI revised «ot%, «ml^^r^i prwsstly b ^ve Gvwar vsmttsn o^pfes 0? ^ tw 1 0?
ms&\ pmposS foe syti mviieo "Work
>2,3 It !he Ooai?aciar|de$ii%s4ihk erfy surfaces or woj^ bjwfach Ns work is to b£ s^p^ojjaffcr^d ?s unaettt?»aofy cr unsultabte wntiefi
ndfflfca&ofc of eai^f caplorjahaH be giveri to feiodn^t otr^^ise no consfcfereifctt will^g^en io daimg for e«m cewpen^toi <cr n&v
13 ^YKCNTSCHSDUlfe /ftfa te Confisaett.

CVDcc-r^Witi IWS«?fep5^B^\0€Sic«a??t5e?3ri etHe^^fe^!f3SK!*«.*Cr»»»' afitfffndt^OOC

-^^1

wtial

the vaUous pelts of tt» Wort eggmgethg
13.! U p O f l ^ f t § o * c w i & C ^
to* total turn of Ms (johMcij trpds out*i stafr * t t * as tjte &>ftfom m f O e ^ i m y a^ upsn, or a* matted by foe Gtamer, and
ty tte p e w , shai be us&Jfi$a
supported by i ® evidence si w to tttteemtts as ib4 oWer may <$»& We «dh^Kto» iehjw
te^ter(Apiptoti^ for ?mmi uNssi tt befcuftdtob*w * ^ ^ *8>¥*8forpayment t '
ufw&fe schedule,
} {18%) .mtertto* shaftfeeM )#»n tfje * a * <tojsc$Htf k* tf* p^i^wst fc yfy| c o a l e d , oetfomied b
'$$mmt$, m ^m^^k
*N <w&*iniB'Of'&• ! ^ ^ ~ : § & f ^ ^ agencies. *

111 final' p%mant * f»
ecoofttonceffShttfr-

,.,_& $ M be iii wtlftty. feta«te #att furrfeh to j&wer a^id $s of BiRa Peia, ooptes of any applicable
a tiki ^/toficfc f i ^ ^ ^ ^ p k s vAo have fum&fted later, n» i ftr ethtr itfng*tothe pedormnrge of &e
torlprogfesspayment llo piyp?er«i I»©«KI l>e in»d» b ^ ^ Ownar i s antf unffl &ich mqutred documsnls »to

invoices, ratesae

W.2 Were &eli be nMm H&*t *«ft payment a &tert&l# f k(i-percent (10%) c{ -ft$ W » of (fje work rneaswea by fhe prcportion thai, fee
$fotnarsyemotfft$sduejarto became &is toCcraractot anv eum m sum*owns
jtag J&»r am#cr maiteji*fe|t*i ih* fob #nfcb isfoe&&&& of && sonirad

byConira&orio

U.3 Owner fesam ff* Jaw' jofesiieKfot *ecfc\ip*''iWS8:fel ^ nc^e to liMfttthokSttj»cccmtem?ej^wih Uta^, Mechanics Urn Uw.
14.4 Mo payinent ma* dh&rte QontKtet sftai! operate• »'fefaa»piaK»-ttf'e«y porttfeof tte'Cofoactoto ^oek arty an edMstion on the pan
offeeOww I M &fe Coji^dior any part ^ " ^ ^ ft*5*W ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 4 s ^ ^ s ^ # ^ o t w ^ m
[ evfdence satisfaw^y io the ^ftfif tot all payretis, fcils for maUd^s ana
? Oonfeatfafc Wafs, teb &®ef! ^fUsfied^, Sych evidfice and stelsmenb ftf&Sve
bem«fe t^aff^aviior uncferjpenalftjoijpijufy. The mtmies sswedby <>iper in aawssncf wfc Secto \32 e M bo
f
dbUftxtedio ContT^ctor^fty {30) days a^srjthe wbrfefej4^ «ied-

145 Priortofcaasice j fma( pky&WLtfwCohSarfor'^aflf

14.6 Peyman(»fnayb»^ihfi ^•djeto:
1) OettiA«'wik m ?
s m6ke peymenU pfop01^ ^^2fa©r. ttaterlaJ. of1 ea«om4fti

& .isaaaiiafl
15.1 *f eit«f party tofifes t o t f b e c K i m ^ * ^
;han W ncrH5e(aui% party *w ^s
r^gHtocercei tMijeowacl l^cntnsstor shjil not 4 ^ * P®* s^cofOTd the ^ c 4 aftoterakrsclwithotn ^e }Witten csnssct of the Owet
non'u,1h5r subccM^a^porKbpr^f-V^ -Csru^-iM^l^iiplm fMT&SsBSon is -the Owre, Tn»|confndtor shal ^assign sjiy smouols due or
IS. VWWiWTY
wfcroefctfyp tirntsmd irtdif t^s cantrsci fix
S period of we{ip ywino4th& dete'of i m p a f ^ .»pidencedby t»-Cfa»|of-'EICRW nssdf Owner/User. Uf«3n Owners wtftcaiion.
extractor $W
fcrwhr
meleftal a|d parferrn iny necessary labor to correct any defect hi the
*'8& Contractofj shaft pernor s6'work «f €^ify]ne4ii4 yybjcH may b2 nscmaiy fft cornifedkm wiih the correcLion of detect* wtet u«
guarantee
1S.2 The service $^e*Je for $ny waftantv ww^slieJi^e A jo»ows - any Acmes c^| Don^rsa hscwwssby 1SOGnoont Conlmctor s^at! provide
servicefeby 5:30^jibe^ms <&t Anj servfep .«m:Cdn&sctor- <ee$tv»tfljr #to$nopa ConVsctor sna^J provide seivfce te by 12.00
li r
E^ef^ency fKuetwns rsqukel seme d^.eaviee ^ afl times,' ilfcontadof shcuM tail to mete s«:b nscesaary
flspatffc ar>o ^p$cem&a&
purpose &tO VM& jbesl |f^eof sh&8 be j>syetfe by Coi^clof u^ai detnanc;

i ' 1 « f

:

I 1

I

?fi!W

16 3 Contraswr warrant* h &<&*& t t o all w&rk ste4 mtejbejd^ne I f Csntratiar ift so<bftla&aa
tfportumahifk*
mannarf
CqhE(m9r
father
mmnte
tfoftonafifta ma?W
C«^^c|of
father
mmnis
thatthat wfequpmanl and wppBas JOTpara&d No (ha we* jaftalfc*paid (or t n f $ by
aftali $a)&&}act i& any 0«nfcitemt«mtfon asl**tn*nt or otfcsr ar«omb«mee.
)IL pDND^&AUTHC^ZgDtee^IOSS: {Mat w f * ^ f a j 6 f a }
i r 1 When ^ppboifafo, C a k s t c f c ^ ' f y p ^ Owner 3 s^cmwcfc band ami Blxr antfflateaal WW *#*a a n £10} days of the dsta mat Afc
wm*&aKsc$ad
1/21! Urtocto? is a coidarett^, tils Bgwm^t $Hsr be.^ yjad bv tft* pfeMlanl and afemtavy of # * cnpcsata. * t Comraciar doe* w& f u m ^
a arparaia surety ml#gye|a«J*e. farthW pofammor p tha agf^amem, the said offican jawd any oiher ^ffcer or dtodor agmna ths
tg JOBRMWfflBft
181
toypwi^te^fc jcoftijary noMtetaftctf^ Otafer ahtf havs the fight to UKxwda &*s Agmemant wiihout causa at any 8ma by
1
$vfog Contrador want •four 4) houns vmtw ftfaeo pmcrf Upon receipt p $m r t o p r Conaactaf immediacy shag t e r m i t e
, every season^ arforj to mitigate i u fataaa and <terna^s hsneuacter, provide hawavarT $* Garavs&oft
$m p&km suck araas mayteftaoassary6 f m e w a p d protect that j » a cl * » Work ^eie^ft^&
. ^, _. idad f i i t o ^ upon askftWmn^laift, Cmtr«cts?r «hfei hevt »«»$* k> the jc& §4*JS for a ftaaoraafca p^wxi j ^
l»tfeirnBd hsreui&r
ttmtfnst to a*ceedj &rtj 0 } iu$>«»» 6apfs trm\ the dita d iesrmr^on) m v«^defym C^t|act0r*s ^ p e r ^ t m ramove «ts a ^ j m ^ n i and
tec$fet 8rtdf*sv*d| % | MI o«3B^f »asidte pf Itt^ ^ » y ion al ^ $ Wo^ tdhMis a s h temj^fioa, iipon suih terming to *5moui cay$«
s i n i of monay thaf$&fc$8 p^dj ^ d Owne^ shrt m & CcrtmdtorJW a^ ratosrsteWenctifffcrances craated by
r
e|ateHiadby0^a(; {tyja w °* flwqr B^ tethztmttattar's post oia5 ^ ^ p e t o m e d harawfer for whch
Contractor, H any
payments Mvsnoi
foe parties Is (Na Agrkms^t, adj . out d &* raiaW^r to this Agiwmam ar tha
181 All claims tfsptfifia'i
braacfcteesf dhaB ^ j a d f a y ari&afeor! m acdrc toe with tta Coftam^ofj W W " | M»toatsn Rules & the Ametesn Mxiraksa
Association utfe$s|&e •aiiies masially agma <Aha4««a H^ce (^ m dbinaiTlpraitattntn shag to $ « i In wntrig wtih ibs o t w p ^ t y t o
m Thadamandahritbaniadb w ttjsrty f35} days after tha eiaan, d f e p ^ or
tfa*A$«3mani*Qa*fl
dema^J far atfttrstton & matte
©ihsf matter In <j^eki
' U^s data ^han irvftiubon o? la^af or equttabfe
Jn c^faaaai^ NBOUI^ be ba«*d by
oromdingitesadj art;
apptabi* statyta of kr^lafeons T^e award
rarafefadby tteaj
or|a ihaB t e ^ ind Judgm«ft|may
rj be aniefad iporvk m
5a with appikslbte law m ajry court havm3
JH^ver a raasonabiamSonwis
junsdfctton thKacf
R* sdcfciiort fo any oihcf nsfref gmme3 by tto
eribnralar*
2D S E P V l C g O f ^ O T O
& 1 Any not«e her**ni^?py tja s©?wd psr^naSy op fija jsaMirmdandani, loramafl or irf^er (^rasn m charge c^ wsrk foi aiif^r pm\ d I it
jobatc. or may be served by fun! or taigmm sert to t ^ e ^ t s s o f t ^ e p a ^ e s s g ^ f o i t h ^ a i a
These ^enar^condfS&j^ sh^nrtofbaenfometfaby m t ^ i ^ f y u ^ each party has a copy <# tte ^rm^ ixmtmi
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DEER CRSST PROJECT ~ ADDENDUM UB"
CERTIFICATE OF INSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
icrtificite Hoiclsr and Warned

O w Cre$i Associates I, LC
Sail Gabriel* CA 51776

rtdmtiowJ Insureds:

' itetrCrest^feterAssociafon^ I C< GramS Harvest Ventures, LLC, Utah Ausp»aous ventures, L L C ;
Cornucopia Crast Vsntuw, L I C Ovnamic Holdings Corporation; Angela C. Sabelia, individually

L.CS& Payable (Mortgages)

Dynamic finance Corporation

Descriptor of Operations'

Deer Ciwt project (sla rssat & housing development) legated in Wasatch County (east of Part* City; ^ to

Project Hme & location,

Deer Cresi Project, WasateVSummit Counties, Uteh

£ Cancellation clause:
Gftwr at Rtbiiity limits;

Required 3D-day& written rt',l<u*toCentficaJe HoHei and Named Additional Insureds
D

Pofcjf is primary & rron-contributory

Q

Poi^cy shall mduiB Contractual Liability w&ragfc

Q *-

Waiver of Sxibfogabon in t a w of cerfificste holder

Genera! Aggregate rartt
Q $20,000,000

Q $5,000,000

f j $2t0CT 001

B$2.00Q,OOr

I IMOOOOOO

f 1 S^ 000 O0G

Eaeh Octu/renca limit
0*5,000,000

Personal & Adverting injury limit
0*5000,000 -

£$2,000,300

f]$W00O

O55CG.CC0

Products and Completed Operations Aggregate
D $5,000,000

Q 82,000.000

fej

$ 500,000

Fire Damage (&tf one fire)

P

S

fvledlca- expanse (any one per son)

10,000

s
rj

ratessianaf (fc+0) liability-

Q $1,000,000

DsducSbte amount per occurrence

Policy Aggregate limit;
Q $5,000,000

D $1,000,000

0**500000

Deductible amount oar occurrence
'liorfceis Compensation

AtJ omobfte Uabtlfty

Per Stetu&y ismrfs
&$1,000,000

Employers Rafcility

O

$1,000,000

Con*Mi20s*n§te \\rmi

Q

Owned £ non-o^ned/hirad vehicle coverage

WW

5_ „ .
L

Copies to be maBed to
8

Dsduc&fe amount per occurrence

0-est Associates i , l C
-"syBW, Suite 200

L^jr-snts and S«ttirt9iun8ten\0*?kiop\Scott Stsr&fcsr StufftSPvsr Z'*&* ad^encten DOC
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Addenda "DM

GUARANTY
Granum Partners, a California limited Partnership ("Guarantor"), whose
address is Post Office Box 2460, Saratoga, California, as a material inducement
to and in consideration of Deer Crest Associates I, tC ("Owner") entering into a
construction contract, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as
Exhibit A, with Silver Creek Development Group, LLC ("Builder") for the
construction of certain town homes, further identified as Deer Crest Townhomes,
building #5 (10513,10515 and 10517 N. Lake View Lane, Heber City, UT 84032)
and any future amendments for additional work at Deer Crest ("Project"), within
that certain development known as Deer Crest Town Homes in Deer Valley.
Utah, guarantees and promises to and for the benefit of Owner that Builder shall
complete construction of the project for a price not to exceed $1,588,926.45. if
the price exceeds $1,588,926.45. Buiider will be responsible for payment to
Buiider for cost overruns. For purposes of this Guaranty, construction of the
Project shall be complete upon (i) Owner receipt of Certificate of Occupancy from
Wasatch County (ii) Wasatch County Fire District and (it?) any Owner punchlist
items

Such construction shall include supplying materials and supervising

subcontractors supplied by Owner]], but shall not include (t) permits (ii) taxes (tii)
utility connections (iv) outdoor spa's. The Guarantor further guarantees and
promises that upon completion of construction of the Project, no liens of any kind
shall encumber title to the town homes identified above as Building 5, as a result
of construction performed by the Builder, if said hens are encumbering the
property then Guarantor will hold harmless, defend and indemnify Owner for any

Page 1 of 2

aftd 3$ d^ma^es and attorney ijejs^s and cost inoijrad by pm$r fn removing $aid
fian. TheC?u&fantor expresslyfc&esnot guarantee (hatthfe Project vwlf be free of
!

Item of spy kind that erwumbdrj title to the town] home$ mr some reason other
than Buyer's construction of tne Project Owner does hot need to'pursue its
cteim agalr&t BuHder before excising fhfc Guaranty against Guarantor, Owner
l
h
may cfocpecfj directly against (guarantor for aifl tsfaims being guaranteed by
Guaramtoit , Robert M, Graraim is General Partner of Guarantor represents and

dthori w bind Guarantor to the
warrants to Owner that he ha3s the capacity and authority
terms ind conditions of this Gu^r|«nt^
Jb& Guaranty ® made] fnltib State of Cafftfmto and!the rights and
obfigatlpnsj of the parties hereto Uistl be interpreted, construed, and enforced in
acc^rdamcfe with ths laws of trie prate of California.] This Guaranty ahafl be sofefy
i
$ubjtjc£jio the jurisdiction of the ^lifomia courts Injand fox fhe County of Santa

I

'

Clara, $taip of| California
Gudr^nfor's ofaftgattor^ u^er this Guaranty £hal! be {binding upon
Guarav($af$ it/ccessors.

Dated fAis ^briday, May 36, 2005 (

Granule

ted Partnership

Robert H.

pBQB 2 Of 2

ADDENDUM E:

IBtefceUaneous Provision i
Addltioriei changes
dUTOOOR SPA: Sjpja tub and tub tnsWiaticfrt Is excluded from the
i
ppce but CoMraotarr p i provide nea^saiy ^P&csal etetMcd outlet and
plumbing for spa fqr future tub insialteiiori by f ownftome buyer,
CLOSET DOOR: Md to master btdrbwc^okte.
2,
RUNCHUSt:Buaqirbl^&f7Puric>ilist; extract price to Include the
3.
fallowing items; j
; !
a R&pour cdnenets driveways for 10495 & 1pS07 R Lake View tms
Dr. and install frcait floor dmtns.
|
Fkifeh lower comjrete fou mJation waite fadr i ski trafl to match
building #8 &#? J
Replace top mowingtowmdkw in living fx
Frost steir to living room to be re-eecumd
Routetowerwcjojl blister and stem
Fix siam on floor
Re-secure haodlml!^
R&patot walls m m water as needed.
I Miscellaneous Making In garage ^
Nail carpet down in lower closet
ii Re-secure rubber urtiwr mamioor in gars*
Re-insi**!} heat lab* and m the v$m any j r heat tape is required
J wifl become payable and apjrfied to future j>uiktmg #4,
ENTRY WALKWAY Sidewaik entiy to have i i decorative finish to be
determinedtewweeks prior to pouring,
;^
ADDENDUM
A
THJJfllNK.
Change
the
Mmne
buitefing completion to ^ •
5.
qn our before Feb^u^ry 28, 2000. - w ^ W J e r ?**-<« * 4 4 U A
^/y^
7
APPUANCES: AH jaopliafices, fireplace, HVJAC, gemge door
r
6,
motor/openers anq ^ther related equipment *prraf*t?e$ shell
<jommer>ce as of ttW date of safe of ekcb unit j
GONTJNGENCY; Landlord to pre-approve requests for CorrSngenc^s
7,
JJ1NAL PAYMENT:] bwner to hold finkl pmyhknl until Owner is in
8.
receipt of (1) a certificate erf occupancy is reoejved for the permits, ill)
sign offe ffom othe^ijoverning authorities i&:roedepartment utilities)
and p ) completer] i f Owner punchfest, W awl The final payment shall
£e &e equivalent of |10% of the total contract price

i

t
I

fni&fc:- Owi«rj

>$/>& 3*#<i

•on •oofcknjgw

S£S£8S£Sm

ss:st seee/ax/da

ADDENDUM E:
Miscellaneous Provisions

Add&onsi changes:
1.
O UTOOOR SPA* Spa tub and tub InstaSatfcm is excluded from the
pnca but Contractor will preside necessary special etedncai outtet and
plumbing for spa for future tub \miallatson by Townhome buyer,
2.
CLOSET DOOR: Add to master bedroom closets.
3.
PUNCHUST: Building #6 & #7 Punchfist Contract pnee to Include the
fallowing items;
a* Re-pour concrete drfve^vays for 10495 & 10507 K Lafce View Lane
Or and install front ftoor drains
b Finish lower concretefoundationwallsfeeingski traif to match
building #6 & #7*
. .
c. Replace top molding to window In Hving room
d First stair to living room to be re-secured
e, Routetowerwood banister and stain
f Fix stain on floor
$. JSe-secure handrails
ru I2^5alrrtwa!l$frsmwatar as nested,
l, Miscellaneous cauffclng in garage
j . Hail carpet dewn in lower closet ^
k, Re-seoure rubber ynd#r *r*andoer in garage.
I Re-instaJI heat tape and in the vent &ny new heat tape is required
wil become payable and applied to future building #4,
A,
ENTRY WALKWAY: StdewaP< entry to have a decorative finish to be
determined two weeks pnor to pounng.
5.
ADDENDUM A TIMELINE: Change the ttmedne buMing completion to
on our b&hre February 28,2000.
6.
APPLIANCES: M appliances,fiiBplace,H V A C , garage door
motor/openers and other related equipment warranties shall
commence as of the date of sate of each unit
7.
CONTINGENCY: Landlord to pre-approve requests for Contingencies
8.
FINAL PAYMENT: Owner to hokJ final payment until Owner is in
receipt of <i) a certificate of occupancy is received for the permits, (ii)
sign offe from other governing auihor&es (&* fire department, utilities)
and (iji) completion c# Owner puachU$tf If any. The final payment shall
be the equivalent of 10% of the total contract price

tn&ste,.

Os^cr

I I

ccrafl&oto]

^

^

J^ilver

!

i ^ e v ^ t a p m e n t One-up* LLC—

CHANGE ORDER
p H & N G E ORDER MO.

fTQ (OONTRACTOR).

SUver Creek Custom Hornet

3/13/20061

[Date of Change Order
|jofc>Ni»nb«r
[Contract Dale

Deer CmlBLDO #3
&20/200S
10517 No, UkevlswLn j

1 Job Locat^aa^

I YOU ARE "akeCTED TO MAKE THEFOLLQWHG CHANGES IN THIS CONTRACT-

""

_

_._J

1 Raise foundation up t o 3* as per Scott Carlson

JfL

%

Front and back of foundation mdudmg engineering,
Site preparation, forming of watls and columns, concrete and steeff
Pump, additional plumbmg costs to raise system,
BackSit material,land necessary e < ^ m e o t . ~ "

1i

\_Oost '

j

48,000.00 j

j
j
j
'

\
i

t

|
I

II

.

*-

,

IMMNVMMMMMMaMMaMMaMWMHflMNaMN^^

[Contract Time Wlfl Be - Increased / Decreased by:
/
Days' 1 0

IQngina! Contract Pnse
iPrevfiousy Authorized Change Orders

$1,588,724 531
$768 25!

Ne^Csmptetfcn Date*
N/A
ACCEPTED: The above prices and specifications
are satisfactory and are hereby accepted AB wo?k
to be done under same terms and concffocms as original
contract unless otrjgrw&e stipulated

New Contract Pnce
IThrs Change Ordef
|New Contract Price
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EXHIBIT B

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DEER CREST ASSOCIATES, L.C, a Utah
limited liability company,

RULING AND ORDER

Plaintiff,

Case No. 070500487

v.
Judge Derek P. Pullan
SILVER CREEK DEVELOPMENT GROUP,
L.L.C.,
Defendant.

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Silver Creek Development Group, L.L.C.'s
("Silver Creek") Motion to Dismiss. Silver Creek filed the motion and supporting memorandum on
January 9, 2008. Plaintiff Deer Crest Associates, L.C. ("Deer Crest") filed a memorandum in opposition
on January 23. 2008. Silver Creek filed a reply memorandum on February 1, 2008. Silver Creek filed a
notice to submit for decision on February 4, 2008. Neither party has requested a hearing.
Silver Creek argues that Deer Crest waived its right to litigate this matter by having failed to
make a timely demand for arbitration under the contract. In the alternative, Silver Creek argues that the
case should be dismissed and the parties ordered into arbitration.
Deer Crest argues that "whether a condition to arbitrability has been fulfilled"—in this case a
timely demand for arbitration—is for the arbitrator to decide, not me court. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 la-
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107(3). Deer Crest asserts that a majority of federal and state courts have ruled that the timeliness of a
demand for arbitration is for the arbitrator to decide.
Having considered the arguments of the parties, the Court denies Silver Creek's motion to
dismiss. Under the contract, timely demand for arbitration is arguably a "condition precedent to
arbitrability5' and therefore an issue for the arbitrator to decide, not the court.
The parties are ordered to arbitrate the dispute in accordance with the terms of their contract.
Pursuant to section 78-3 la-108(7), these judicial proceedings are stayed pending completion of the
arbitration.
DATED this

S~~ day of February,
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EXHIBIT C

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION
Case No. 77 110 00099 08 SUBR
In the Matter of the Arbitration between
Deer Crest Associates I, L.C.
Claimant,
RULING ON RESPONDENT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS

v.
Silver Creek Development Group, LLC,
Respondent.

Respondent Silver Creek Development Group, LLC ("Silver Creek") has filed a motion
to dismiss this Arbitration on the ground that the American Arbitration Association ("AAA")
lacks jurisdiction to arbitrate this matter because Claimant Deer Crest Associates I, L.C. ("Deer
Crest") failed to file its demand for arbitration within thirty days of when the dispute arose. For
the reasons set forth below, the Arbitrator grants Silver Creek's motion.
Background.
Deer Crest is the owner of certain real property located in Wasatch County, Utah referred
to as the Deer Crest Townhouses.
On July 1, 2005, Deer Crest and Silver Creek entered into an AIA Al 01-1997 Standard
Form of Agreement Between Owner and Contractor ("Contract") wherein Silver Creek agreed to
construct Building 5 and finish punch list items on Buildings 6 and 7 of the Deer Crest
Townhouses in return for payment of $1,588,926,45, before adjustments.

On February 5, 2007, Deer Crest terminated the Contract on the ground that Silver Creek
failed to timely complete the work required under the Contract. Thereafter, Deer Crest hired a
new contractor to complete the work. That work was completed in early 2008, at a cost in excess
of the Contract Sum under the Contract.
Article 8.1.2 of the Contract provides that: "The General Conditions are the 1997 edition
of the General Conditions of the Contract for Construction, AIA Document A201-1997." Article
8,1.6 also identifies "Addenda [sic] B: General Conditions of the Contract & Insurance
Requirements" as a Contract Document.
Subparagraph 4.4.1 of AIA A201-1997 provides that: "Claims, including those alleging
an error or omission by the Architect... shall be referred to initially to the Architect for
decision. An initial decision by the Architect shall be required as a condition precedent to
mediation, arbitration or litigation of all Claims between the Contractor and Owner arising prior
to the date final payment is due, unless 30 days have passed after the Claim has been referred to
the Architect with no decision having been rendered by the Architect." Subparagraph 4.6.1
provides in part that: "Any Claim arising out of or related to the Contract. . . shall after decision
by the Architect or 30 days after submission of the Claim to the Architect, be subject to
arbitration." Subparagraph 4.6.3 provides that: UA demand for arbitration shall be made within
the time limits specified in Subparagraphs 4,4,6 and 4.6.1 as applicable, and other cases within a
reasonable time after the Claim has arisen, and in no event shall it be made after the date when
institution of a legal proceeding based on such Claim would be barred by the applicable statute
of limitations as determined pursuant to Paragraph 13.7." Subparagraph 4.4.6 provides that a
demand for arbitration must be filed within 30 days after the Architect renders his final decision.
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Subparagraph 4.6.1 allows a party to commence arbitration if the Architect has not rendered a
final decision within thirty days after submission of the Claim to the Architect.
Paragraph 19.1 of Addenda [sic] B provides in pertinent part:
Ail claims, disputes and other matters in question between the parties to this
Agreement arising out of or relating to this Agreement or the breach thereof,
shall be decided by arbitration in accordance with the Construction Industry
Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association unless the parties
mutually agree otherwise. Notice of the demand for arbitration shall be filed in
writing with the other party to this Agreement and with the American Arbitration
Association. The demand shall be made within thirty (30) days after the claim,
dispute or other matter in question has arisen. In no event shall the demand for
arbitration be made after the date when institution of legal proceedings based
upon such claim, dispute, or other matter in questions [sic] would be barred by
the applicable statute of limitations.
In November, 2007, Deer Crest commenced Civil No. 070500487 in the Fourth Judicial
District Court, in and for Wasatch County, State of Utah, by filing a complaint styled Deer Crest
Associates I} LC} v. Silver Creek Development Group, LLC ("Lawsuit"). After being served in
the action, Silver Creek filed a motion to dismiss the Lawsuit arguing that Deer Crest's alleged
failure to file a demand for arbitration within thirty days after Deer Crest's claim arose barred its
claim. In the alternative, Silver Creek requested that the Court dismiss the Lawsuit and order the
parties to arbitrate their dispute. Deer Crest opposed Silver Creek's motion, but asserted that
whether the demand for arbitration was timely filed was a "condition to arbitrability" which was
a matter for the arbitrator to decide,
On February 5, 2008, the Honorable Judge Derek P. Pullan denied Silver Creek's Motion
to Dismiss, Judge Pullan held that the issue of whether the demand for arbitration was timely
filed was arguably "a condition precedent to arbitrability" which, under Utah Code Ann. § 783la-107(3), was a matter for the arbitrator to decide. On that ground, Judge Pullan referred the
matter to arbitration and stayed the Lawsuit pending completion of the arbitration.

3

On March 3, 2008, Deer Crest filed its demand for arbitration with the AAA and served a
copy upon Silver Creek's counsel The Arbitrator was appointed. The Arbitrator and counsel
for the parties participated in a preliminary hearing on June 11, 2008. At that hearing, Silver
Creek's counsel advised the Arbitrator that Silver Creek intended to file a motion to dismiss.
The Arbitrator set deadlines agreed to by counsel for the parties for the filing of that motion and
related briefing. Silver Creek timelyfiledits motion which is now before the Arbitrator.
Analysis.
The threshold issue before the Arbitrator is whether Deer Crest timely filed its demand
for arbitration. In order to address that issue, the Arbitrator must first aetermine the deadline for
filing the demand under the terms of the Contract Documents. As set forth above,
Subparagraphs 4.4.6,4.6.1 and 4.6.3 of the AIA A201-1997 General Conditions require that a
demand be made within: (1) thirty days after the Architect makes afinaldecision; (2) thirty days
after the Architect fails to timely make a final decision on a dispute; or (3) within a reasonable
time. Paragraph 19.1 of Addenda [sic] B, however, requires the demand to be filed within thirty
days after the "claim, dispute or other matter in question has arisen."
Deer Crest argues that the Arbitrator should consider these provisions together to
conclude that the thirty7 day requirement of Paragraph 19.1 is not applicable. After reviewing
these provisions, however, the Arbitrator has determined that Paragraph 19.1 of Addenda [sic] B
provides for a different arbitration scheme than do Subparagraphs 4.4.6, 4.6.1 and 4.6.3 of the
AIA 201-1997 General Conditions. The Arbitrator concludes that only one of the two schemes,
not both, can apply. When parties agree to an addendum to anothet document, they generally
intend that the addendum change or modify that document. In this case, the parties agreed to
adopt Addenda [sic] B which changes or modifies the terms of the AIA A201-1997 General
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Conditions. That the parties intended this result is supported by the fact that the AIA A201 -1997
General Conditions are form provisions, whereas Addenda [sic] B addresses many of the same
issues as the AIA A201-1997 General Conditions and was specially crafted by the parties
themselves. Therefore, the Arbitrator concludes that where the provisions of Paragraph 19.1
differ from those of the AIA A201-1997 General Conditions, they supersede them. In this case,
Paragraph 19.1 supersedes Subparagraphs 4:4.6, 4,6.1 and 4.6.3 of the AIA A201-1997 General
Conditions.
Having determined that Paragraph 19.1 of Addenda [sic] B governs the arbitration of
disputes under the Contract Documents, the Arbitrator now considers whether Deer Crest
satisfied the requirement that the demand for arbitration be filed within tcthirty days after the
claim, dispute or other matter is question has arisen/'
Deer Crest argues that its claim arose only after it learned the extent of its damages in
February of 2008. That is when Ferran Construction, the completion contractor, finished its
work and provided Deer Crest with itsfinalinvoice for that work. Deer Crest points out that its
contract with Ferran Construction was a cost plus a fee contract. For that reason, the total
amount owed to Ferran Construction under that contract could not be determined until Ferran
Construction finished the work. Silver Creek, on the other hand, argues that the claim arose on
February 5, 2007, the date that Deer Crest terminated Silver Creek. To resolve this issue under
Utah law, the Arbitrator looks for guidance to pronouncements of Utah courts regarding the
accrual of a cause of action for purposes of statutes of limitations analysis.
In S & G, Inc. v. Intermountain Power Agency, 913 P. 2d 735, (Utah 1996), the Utah
Supreme Court stated that; "Generally, a cause of action accrues and the relevant statute of
limitations begins to run 'upon the happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of
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action/ (cites omitted) A contract action ordinarily accrues at the time of the breach." Id at
740. In Clarke v. Living Scriptures, Inc., 114 P. 3d 602 (Utah App. 2005), the court explained:
"S&G stands for the proposition that, in a breach of contract case, one does not await the accrual
of damages to begin the running of the statue of limitations/' Id at 604.
This is a breach of contract case. Therefore, the "claim, dispute or other matter in
question" arose upon the breach. That occurred at least as of February 5, 2007, the date Deer
Crest terminated its contract with Silver Creek because of its breach. That occurred more than
one year before Deer Crest filed its demand for arbitration. Therefore, the Arbitrator concludes
that Deer Crest did not satisfy the requirement of Paragraph 19.1 that the demand be filed
"within thirty days after the claim, dispute or other matter in question" arose.
To determine the effect of failing to file the demand within the period set forth in the
contract for filing the demand, the Arbitrator looks to the Utah Court of Appeals' recent decision
in Kenny v. Rich, 605 Utah Adv. Rep, 12 filed May 30, 2008. In that case, the defendant sought
arbitration of a dispute with a homeowner's association regarding its refusal to grant the
defendant a variance from side yard requirements imposed by subdivision restrictive covenants.
The declaration containing the covenants required that a party desiring arbitration of a decision
by the homeowner's association must file a demand for arbitration within thirty days after
receiving notice of the homeowner association's decision. The defendant filed his demand
thirty-six days after he received the notice. On that basis, the Court ruled that the defendant had
waived his right to arbitrate the dispute and that the arbitrators therefore lacked jurisdiction to
arbitrate the dispute and allowed the homeowners association to proceed with its injunction
action in court.
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Based upon the foregoing authority, the Arbitrator is compelled to conclude that Deer
Crest waived its right to arbitration under the Contract Documents by failing to file its demand
within the time set forth in the Contract Documents. Therefore, the AAA lacks further
jurisdiction to resolve this matter under the Contract Documents,
Dated this 5th day of August, 2008.

l^a/judS
David M. Wahlquist
Arbitrator
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EXHIBIT D

EVAN A. SCHMUTZ (3680)
ANDY V. WRIGHT (11071)
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, L.C.
RiverView Plaza, Suite 300
4844 North 300 West
Provo, Utah 84604-5663
Telephone (801) 375-6600
Attorneys for Silver Creek Development Group, LLC
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DEER CREST ASSOCIATES I, L.C, a
Utah Limited Liability Company,
Plaintiff,

[PROPOSED] ORDER DENYING
GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING
IN PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
LIFT STAY

vs.
SILVER CREEK DEVELOPMENT
GROUP LLC,

Case No: 070500487
Judge Derek P. Pullan

Defendant.

This matter was called before the court on December 8, 2008 for a hearing on Plaintiffs
Motion to Lift Stay. Plaintiff Deer Crest Associates I, L.C. ("Deer Crest") was represented by
Eric G. Easterly. Defendant Silver Creek Development Group, LLC ("Silver Creek") was
represented by Evan A. Schmutz. The Court having reviewed the pleadings and papers filed by
the parties in connection with the Motion to Lift Stay and having given the parties an opportunity
to present oral argument, the court took the matter under advisement without recessing court and

thereafter issued a ruling from the bench, denying Deer Crest's Motion to Lift Stay. Good cause
appearing, the Court now enters the following findings of fact, conclusions of law and order:
Findings of Fact
1.

The Court finds that this matter was properly referred to arbitration and that the

Arbitrator issued a written Decision on August 5, 2008, in which the Arbitrator granted Silver
Creek's Motion to Dismiss. The Arbitrator dismissed Deer Crest's arbitration claim, finding that
because of Deer Crest's failure to file a demand for arbitration within the thirty day limitation
period set forth in the parties' agreement, the Arbitrator had no jurisdiction to hear Deer Crest's
claim and the same was therefore dismissed.
2.

On July 1, 2005, the parties entered into an AIA A101-1997 Standard Form of

Agreement Between Owner and Contractor ("Agreement"). Paragraph 19.1 of the Addenda to
that Agreement, which was made an enforceable part of the Agreement, requires that "[a]U
claims, disputes and other matters in question between the parties to this Agreement, arising out
of or relating to this Agreement or the breach thereof, shall be decided by arbitration .... The
demand [for arbitration] shall be made within thirty (30) days after the claim, dispute or other
matter in question has arisen."
3.

The Court, having reviewed the record, finds that Deer Crest's demand for

arbitration was filed beyond the thirty day limitation period set forth in paragraph 19.1 of the
parties' agreement.
4.
attorney fees.

The Agreement provides for that the prevailing party is entitled to an award of its

Conclusions of Law
1.

The Court concludes as a matter of law that the Agreement between the parties is

enforceable, and that the parties knowingly and intentionally agreed to submit any claim or
dispute arising out of the Agreement to binding arbitration and agreed to be bound by paragraph
19.1 of the Agreement and the thirty (30) day limitation on the time for filing an arbitration
demand contained therein.
2.

The Court concludes as a matter of law that Deer Crest's execution of the

Agreement constitutes a knowing and intentional waiver of any right to a judicial remedy under
Article I, §§7 and 11 of the Utah Constitution. See Duke v. Graham, 158 P.2d 540, 546 (Utah
2007). The Court concludes that strict enforcement of paragraph 19.1 of the Agreement would
not violate Deer Crest's constitutional rights.
3.

The Court concludes that Deer Crest having waived any right to a judicial remedy,

and having had its arbitration claim dismissed for failure to timely file the same, Deer Crest has
no right to seek a judicial remedy.
4.

As the prevailing party in arbitration and in these judicial proceedings, Silver

Creek is entitled to an award of its reasonable attorney fees. Silver Creek may establish the
amount of attorney fees by affidavit and Deer Crest may object, if it desires to do so.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Deer Crest's Motion to Lift Stay is hereby granted for the limited purpose of

allowing the Court to rule on the issue presented as to whether Deer Crest is entitled to seek a
judicial remedy following a dismissal of its claim in arbitration, and to determine the amount of
any fees which should be awarded to the prevailing party.

2.

Deer Crest's Motion is denied to the extent it seeks to lift the stay and proceed

with its claims in this judicial proceeding.
3.

Deer Crest's Complaint is hereby dismissed with prejudice.

4.

Silver Creek is awarded its reasonable attorney fees in the amount of
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$ 7.333.STQ •
DATED this J ?

/-<?-*?
day of December 2008.
BY THE COURT:

e Derek P. Pullan
istrict Judge
Approval as to Form:

Eric G. Easterly
Attorneys for Plaintiff Deer Crest Associates I, L.C.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the

of December, 2008 she caused a

true and correct copy of the foregoing to be delivered to the following:
Eric G. Easterly
2524 Fairway Village Drive
P.O. Box 681238
Park City, Utah 84068-1238
Sent Via:

X

Hand-Delivery
Facsimile
Mailed (postage prepaid)

if
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